The use of bracketing in wealth surveys is sometimes criticized on the grounds that it will encourage respondents to substitute rough guesses for careful thought. In such a manner, the use of bracketing will "crowd-out" more specific answers, creating the illusion of a reduction in nonresponse. This paper examines the patterns of wealth response in the first two waves of the Health and Retirement Study. On average, people do not appear to transition to bracketing across waves. New tests of the breakeven level of crowding out are suggested. Based on the explanatory power of the brackets, the degree of crowding-out which would be necessary to make the use of bracketing counterproductive appears to be much higher than plausible.
answer the question. This paper will proceed as follows. Section two will provide a brief description of two waves of HRS. Whether bracketing appear to crowd out more precise reports of wealth will be examined. The following section will incorporate the results of the previous section into a model of the level of crowding-out necessary to make bracketing undesirable. Some evidence will also be presented as to where along this range the HRS appears to lie. The last section provides a brief conclusion.
2 "Crowding-Out"
The Data
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a national longitudinal survey focusing on the 1931 to 1941 birth cohort. Interviews conducted every two years will examine the health and wealth dynamics of individuals as they approach and enter retirement. The first wave of the Health and Retirement Survey was conducted between March 1992 and March 1993, yielding a sample of 12,652 respondents, and 7,702 households. The response rate was 82%. The second wave of the HRS was conducted by telephone from May 1994 to January 1995, producing 11,602 interviews for a 92.1% response rate.
Our sample includes households who do not have any major changes in composition.
For example, households which had new spouses or suffered divorces were excluded.
A few households were also omitted because the interviewer mistakenly took either no or multiple financial interviews. Households in which a spouse died were included unless the surviving spouse had since remarried. These selection criteria resulted in 16% of wave 1 households being omitted from the wave 2 sample.
The wave 2 interview contained several modifications to wealth measurement.
Since the second wave was a telephone survey, a range card was not used for the wealth module. Brackets could still be provided through the unfolding bracket sequence. The use of bracketing was also expanded to include housing and household debt, the two components in wave 1 which did not use the unfolding sequence. Bracketing was also used for the income module in an attempt to reduce the level of missing data in the module. A separate section on capital gains was also added in an attempt to separate changes in wealth due to savings from those due to capital gains. This section included questions on the purchase and sale of assets such as housing, real estate, stocks, bonds. Information about capital improvements to housing and real estate, and additions to employer-sponsored pensions was also solicited.
The breakpoints for the wave two sequence of unfolding questions were refined using an algorithm developed by Heeringa, Hill and Howell (1995) . This method sought to maximize the expected explanatory power of the brackets over a weighted combination of the limiting cases of a Box-Cox transformation, level and log-level.
As a result, the breakpoints were changed substantially for many assets. A common result of the breakpoint optimization was to dramatically increase the amount of the highest breakpoint. For example, the top bracket of both real estate wealth and stock wealth increase from "$150,000 and above" to "$1,000,000 and above", while the top bracket of checking and savings wealth increases from "$50,000 and above" to "$300,000 and above."
As mentioned earlier, bracketing has dramatically reduced the non-response rates. Table 1 lists nonresponse rates for two waves of HRS on ownership. In general nonresponse at this stage is not a significant problem for any of the surveys. Table 2 represents the nonresponse rates of individuals who were identified as holding the asset. From this table, it is clear that the unfolding questions are extremely successful in obtaining some information from individuals, and assigning nonresponses into at least a broad asset range. Comparison to the SIPP which does not ask such unfolding questions shows that the use of these questions is extremely helpful. For certain assets such as stocks, bonds, and real estate, the unfolding questions are able to reduce the nonresponse rate from above 30% to single digits.
"Crowding-Out"
Critics of the use of bracketing point to the possibility that the option of providing a bracket rather than a specific amount will lead people to substitute rough guesses for careful thought. In such a scenario, bracketed responses will "crowd out" more precise responses, making the reduction in non-response little more than an optical illusion.
Previous work using the AHEAD suggests that the bracket option is particularly employed by those older in age and those with indicators of cognitive impairment, suggesting that bracketing elicits new information (Chand and Gan 1994) . Indeed, the apparent success of bracketing in wealth estimation led to its use in income estimation in wave two of both the HRS and AHEAD. However, since the use of bracketing is fairly new and the possible effects are poorly documented, the second wave provides a worthwhile opportunity to systematically address this phenomenon.
The phenomenon of crowding-out is difficult to examine with only cross-sectional data. Heeringa et al. (1995) examine whether individuals become more likely to provide brackets as their exposure to bracketing within the wave increases and find minimal effects. The drawback of this approach is that different asset holdings are likely to be characterized by different degrees of knowledge, possibly confounding the effects of bracketing exposure. This paper will utilize the longitudinal structure of the survey to examine whether individuals become increasingly likely to provide brackets rather than amounts across waves of the survey. To the extent that individuals learn within a wave, the same effect should be exhibited across waves, with the added advantage that the panel structure will allow one to control for asset heterogeneity.
After the magnitude of these effects is gauged, this paper will model the tradeoff between precision and non-response to determine when it would be counterproductive to employ a bracketing sequence. Table 1 shows the rate of asset ownership and non-response in waves one and two. The rate of missing data on ownership remains at a low level in the second wave despite the switch to telephone interviews. Vehicle wealth and bank accounts remain the most common forms of wealth in wave 2. As expected the ownership rates of IRAs and other pensions increase substantially from wave 1 to wave 2. Stock ownership increases slightly while ownership of CDs decreases, reflecting the broad market trends over the time period. Table 2 displays the frequency of asset response type of owners of the different assets in the first two waves of the HRS. On first glance, it appears that the percentage of asset owners who respond using brackets increases in the second wave. The increase is more noteworthy for assets which might be expected to present privacy concerns. For example, the proportion of business owners who uses brackets increases from 20% to 30% in wave 2. Similar increases are seen for stocks and bonds. However, this first glance is misleading. While the proportion of bracketed responses increases, the percentage of continuous responses also remains steady or increases. While business, stocks, and bond holdings become more likely to be ascertained through the unfolding sequence, the proportion of owners who provide amounts remains steady.
For other assets such as IRAs/Keough, checking/savings accounts, and vehicle wealth, the proportion providing amounts increases by roughly four percent. The source of this discrepancy is a change in survey format between waves 1 and 2. In wave 1, a range card was utilized in a further attempt to reduce non-response. This option was discontinued in wave 2 since the interviews were telephone rather than in person.
While the range card was meant to be used as a means of last resort, in practice it was used by some respondents before the unfolding sequence was asked. If one believes that these respondents would have been nonrespondents, the rate of bracketing increases slightly between the two waves (and non-response decreases dramatically between the two waves). On the other hand, if one believes that they would have otherwise provided unfolding brackets, then the rate of bracketing decreases across the two waves.
Several reasons suggest that the range card answers should be treated as bracketers rather than nonrespondents for the analysis of crowding out. First, the information ascertained is very similar to that from the unfolding brackets. Range cards assign households into brackets, often of narrower width due to a greater number of categories. Second, examination of how households who used the range card in wave one responded in wave 2 suggests that they behave more like the bracketers than the nonrespondents. Table 3 combines a household's responses in waves 1 and 2.
Roughly 85% who provided an amount in the first wave also provided an amount in the second wave. Those who provided a bracket in the first wave were less likely to provide an amount in the second wave, while nonrespondents in the first wave (those who own the asset but provided no information about amount) were least likely to provide an amount in wave 2. From this table one can see that those who used the range card in wave 1 behave more closely in wave 2 (when the range card option is no longer available) to those who provided brackets in wave 1 than to those who were nonrespondents in wave 1. Furthermore, the rate of complete non-response (owners who provide neither amounts nor brackets) suggests that those who used the range card were not those converted from non-response since we do not observe an increase in non-response once the range card is discarded in wave 2. These considerations suggest that these households would be better categorized as bracketers than non-respondents. Therefore, when one combines range card respondents with bracketed respondents, the percentage of households employing some kind of bracket no longer increases sharply between waves 1 and 2. Fears of a strong "crowding out" effect across waves did not seem to materialize.
Optimal Bracketing
Although there is no crowding-out effect across waves, there still may exist some "fixed-effect" type of crowding out. It is possible to determine under what conditions it is desirable to allow the bracketing option to respondents, and whether these conditions are likely to have been met.
Consider the following simple model of the decision to offer a choice of a bracketing option. The wealth module is constructed to elicit wealth information such that the post-imputation sum of squared errors is minimized. Respondents may fall into three possible groups -continuous respondents (those who provide a specific amount), bracketed respondents who provide a range, and nonrespondents. Continuous respondents do not require imputation, while the other two groups each require an amount to be imputed and have an associated error. The imputation error for nonrespondents will be highest, followed by bracketers, and then continuous observations (typically assumed to have zero error). The bracketing option should be included in the survey design if the expected imputation error is lower in the bracketing regime.
These considerations may be represented by the following objective function which the survey design attempts to minimize the total sum of squared errors (TSS), which is sum of squared errors of continuous responses, bracket responses and non-responses.
where n c , n b , n n represent the number of continuous, bracketed, and nonrespondent observations respectively. Direct comparison of TSS under the two regimes is impossible since we do not observe the counter-factual case, particularly the proportion of bracketers who would have provided amounts had the other regime been operative.
Nonetheless, we can form an estimate of what this proportion would have had to
have been to make it counterproductive to allow bracketing. Assuming for the time being that this proportion is unrelated to the bracket, call this proportion x. This requires solving for the level of x which equalizes the observed TSS with the TSS in the counter-factual case.
1 Apparently, if different objective functions are used, the test designed here will be different. We use TSS as our objective because (1) It was used by Heeringa et al. (1995) to design and conduct the surveys; (2) It is consistent with what these data will likely be used for: least square.
If all individuals within the same response mode have the same SSE, then the TSS in Equation (1) is simply changed to:
The TSS in the counter-factual case, without the bracketing option, depends on the percent of bracketers which would have become continuous respondents rather than nonrespondents. Representing the percentage which would have become continuous respondents as x, without the bracketing option, the TSS in (2) would become:
This assumes the simple case where bracketers would have had the same distribution of amounts as the observed distribution. Assuming that continuous respondents do not require any imputation, then SSE c = 0, and the breakeven point where the TSS with and without the bracketing option are the same is given simply by
Under these assumptions, the fraction x b , necessary for the bracketing option to be undesirable depends on the difference in squared-errors of nonrespondents and bracketers. Thus, the breakeven level of crowding out depends on the degree to which the brackets reduce the variation in imputed wealth. The value of x b will depend on the imputation technique.
To calculate the value of x b , let us consider a simple "hotdeck" imputation method.
Let the set of all continuous response in bracket j be W The average imputation error is given by
where w is the average of all imputed bracket responses, and B is the total number of bracketed responses.
For non-response, the imputation is carried by randomly drawing from all continuous responses. Let the imputed value be denotedŵ k . The total imputation error is given by (6).
where K is the total number of non-responses, and w n is the average of imputed values from all non-responses. If the non-respondents and the bracketers have the same variance, i.e.,
becomes
Equation (7) is exactly the R 2 in a regression of wealth on dummies for the brackets.
For assets, where a substantial proportion of the variation in asset holdings can be explained by knowledge of bracket alone, the proportion of households which were "crowded out" from amounts to brackets needs to be quite high to make it undesirable to provide a bracketing option.
The counter-factual level of non-response (NR) implied by the breakeven level of crowding-out is given simply by
where z b represents the proportion of owners who are bracketers and x b represents the breakeven level of crowding-out. NR initial is the nonresponse rate before the bracketing questions. Let z c be the proportion of owners who gave continuous responses,
If no bracketing responses are available, a non-response rate that is lower than NR implied would have made bracketing undesirable. The implied crowding-out and non-response rates are listed in table 4 for wave 1 and table 5 for wave 2. An examination of non-response rates suggests that the actual proportion of households which is crowded-out is nowhere near the R 2 level of most of the assets (using the untransformed metric). Were the proportion to be high, then the initial non-response rates for amount without the bracketing option would have had to be very low, typically between 5% and 10% for log levels and between 10% and 15% for levels. Nonresponse in SIPP (see Table 2 ), a major survey which does not provide a bracketing option, suggests that non-response is much closer NR initial rather than the levels necessary to make it counterproductive to provide a bracketing option. Thus, the evidence suggests that under all but the most extreme assumptions, the use of bracketing is desirable.
The above model makes a number of simplifying assumptions which are unlikely to be true in the empirical data. Most of these assumptions can be relaxed without appreciably changing the conclusions. First, to the extent that continuous values themselves contain some noise, the level of crowding out necessary to make bracketing suboptimal increases. This is intuitively clear since less precision on the part of continuous observations makes it less harmful to have crowding out of continuous responses.
3 Secondly, to the extent that covariates are used in the imputation, the effect on x b depends on whether the explanatory variables have more explanatory power on the regression of amounts within brackets versus amounts across brackets. Since covariates typically explain more variation across brackets than variation within brackets, it is likely that the breakeven level of crowding out would decrease somewhat. However, since the explained variation is likely to be low both within and across brackets, the effect of covariates on the tradeoff is likely to be of second-order.
Conclusions
The use of bracketing in wealth surveys is sometimes criticized on the grounds that it will encourage respondents to substitute rough guesses for careful thought. In such a manner, the use of bracketing will "crowd-out" more specific answers, creating the illusion of a reduction in non-response. This paper examines the patterns of wealth response in the first two waves of the Health and Retirement Study. The use of the different methods of wealth response appear to be systematic and to vary in the expected directions. Based on the observed patterns, fears of a crowding-out effect appear to be overstated. On average, people do not appear to transition to bracketing.
would be necessary to make the use of bracketing counterproductive appears to be much higher than plausible. New tests of the breakeven level of crowding out are suggested by this differential effect. 
